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APPENDIX K 
Trireme Warfare in Xenophon's Hellenika 
§l. The disaster at Syracuse• (415-413) marked the effective end of Athenian naval 
supremacy. She would rebuild her fleets and continue to be a force, but Xenophon 's 
account of the following half century tells of a hard-fought struggle among many 
contenders to dominate the Aegean Sea.b Although in the ancient Mediterranean 
world geography and tradition favored islands and coastal cities as emergent sea pow­
ers, dominance could not be achieved without also having access to the vital resources 
of timber, manpower, and plenty of revenue.• Thus the Persian king Artaxerxes and 
Jason of Pheraid posed alarming threats to the traditional masters of the Aegean. 
Athens, Sparta, and reportedly the Phoenicians managed on occasion to raise fleets of 
two or even three hundred warships,• but mostly the seas were dotted with much 
smaller flotillas that nevertheless effectively patrolled, threatened, or deterred. 
§2. The standard ship of the line in all these navies was the trireme, a seaborne 
projectile armed with a bronze ram and powered by three banks of rowers.' 
Triremes patrolled coasts, blockaded harbors,b guarded sea-lanes (especially those 
from the grain-rich Black Sea),• enforced the collection of tribute and tolls,d and 
transported armies,• important people/ and news. But most essentially triremes 
were designed for battle on the open seas. Speed and ramming were their primary 
offensive weapons. Only a small complement of fighting men-ten marines and four 
archers-was traditionally stationed on a trireme. The number and nature of armed 
men on board could vary,s but the ram remained the primary weapon. Unlike those 
of tubby merchant ships, built for capacity, trireme hulls were long and narrow,h 
probably able to slice through the water as fast as any oar-powered ship before or 
since, propelled by the coordinated strokes of 170 oarsmen. A crew of sixteen sailors 
and officers operated the sails, and they, together with the normal complement of 
armed men and the rowers, brought the total number of men on a trireme to 200. 
Triremes could also be equipped with sails, so wind had to be taken into account as 
K.la Syracuse (in Sicily): Ref. Map 1. 
K.l b Aegean Sea: Ref. Map 2, BX. 
K.lc See 5.2.16, 6.1.11, 7.1.3-7. 
K.ld Phcrai (in Thessaly): Ref. Map 2, BX. 
K.le Large Phoenician fleets: 2.1.20, 2.2.7, 3.4.1. 
Phoenicia: Ref. Map I. 
K.2a S<:e Figure K.2. 
K.2b S<:e 2.2.9, 4.8.6, 5.1.2, 5.1.7, 6.2.7-8. 
K.2c See 1.1.22, 2.J.l7, 4.6.14, 5.4.61. 
K.2d See 1.1.8, 1.1.12, 1.1.22, 4.8.27, 4.8.31, 5.1.6, 
6.2.38. 
K.2c See 6.4.18. 
K.2f See 1.1.9, 4.1.15. 
K.2g S<:e 1.2.1, 6.2.37. 
K.2h Approximately 120 by 15 feet. 
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FIGURE K.l. THE TRIREME 0LYMPIAS UNDER SAIL. 
a factor in strategy, but battle tactics were based entirely on rowing maneuvers. In 
preparation for battle, every care was taken to gain the advantage of superior speed. 
Sails and all items extraneous to the battle at hand (masts, tackle, spares, supplies) 
were removed from the ship.i The hulls themselves were dry-docked as often as pos­
sible in order to keep them from becoming waterlogged and thus from sitting heav­
ily and moving slowly in the water.i Not all triremes were in equal condition or 
could attain equal speeds. k Trireme crews took pride in crewing the fastest ship in a 
fleet, and captains selected the most experienced men to complete their crews.1 The 
tip of this giant water-arrow was a bronze ram that splintered enemy hulls or oars 
upon contact. The force of impact was as destructive as the pronged tip of the 
K2i This would explain how the Athenian general 
Konon, in flight from Aigospotamoi (Aigospota· 
mos) (Ref. Map 2, AY), was able to capture the 
main sails of the Pcloponnesian fleet (2.1.29), 
which had been left in camp before the battle. 
This capture may well have hindered, if nor pre· 
vented, the Peloponnesians from pursuing his 
ships. See also 6.2.27. 
K2j See 1.5.10. 
K.2k Sec 2.1.24, 5.1.27. 
K.21 Sec 1.6.19. 
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FIGURE K.2. CROSS-SECTIONAL 
DIAGRAM OF A TRIREME, SHOW­
ING PLACEMENT OF THE THREE 
TIERS OF ROWING STATIONS. 
weapon; the head of the ram was designed to strike a broad area and split as many 
seams of the enemy hull as possible without actually penetrating (and thus getting 
stuck in) the foreign wood. 
§3. Conventional sea battles began with a face-off: the rw·o opposing navies lined 
up against each other.> Each line was extended as far as possible in order to prevent 
the enemy from sailing around the ends of the line and attacking the unprotected 
sterns from behind (periplous). At the same time, the line could not be over­
extended; ships had to be spaced closely enough to prevent the enemy from sailing 
through gaps (diekplous) and either smashing through one's own oars or wheeling 
about and attacking from behind.b And commanders had to consider yet a third fac­
tor: ships could not be so closely packed that their oars interfered with those of the 
adjacent ship in their own line. If a commander did not trust his single line to hold 
out against a superior opponent, he might form a second line behind the first, to 
cover the point(s) of weakness.< A fleet whose line had been outflanked or breached 
had few defensive options. A commander with skilled crews could pull his ships into 
a circle, prows bristling outward, and hope to stave off his opponents until exhaus­
tion or nightfall prompted them to give up the attack. Or he could order a tactical 
retreat to a nearby beach from which his ships could be similarly defended.d 
§4. It was extremely difficult to achieve any of these offensive or defensive forma­
tions. Ancient accounts of naval encounters frequently describe how winds, currentS, 
the crews' varying levels of skill and commitment, and the unpredictable fortunes of 
war• altered the blueprints of battles. Drills on the Olympias,b a modern reconstruction 
K.3a See 1.6.31, 2.1.23. 
K. 3b The Athenian formation at Arginousai was 
designed to prevent this; �c 1.6.31. 
K.3c Sec 1.6.29-32 for the dcplO)'mcnts of the two 
opposing fleetS at the battle of the Arginousai 
Islands (Ref. Map 2, BY). 
K.3d Sec 1.1.7. 
K.4a For example, Kallikratidas' unfortunate tumble at 
1.6.33. 
K.4b The O/ympi41 was designed by scholars and marine 
architects and commissioned in 1987. The ship is 
on permanent display at the Hdlcnic Navy 
Museum, ncar the Pciraicus. Sec Figures K.l, K.2, 
K.3, and 2.2.7; sec also}. S. Morrison,}. F. 
Coates, and N. B. Rankov, Tht Athmia11 Trireme: 
71Jt History swd Reconstruction of sw A11cimr Grtdt 
Warship, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univcr· 
siry Press, 2000), esp. pp. 231-75. 
APPENDIX K Trireme Warfare i1J Xenophon's Hellenika 
Side: view 
0 1 0 15 20 25 30 35 
Top view 
Stern Midship Bow 
Cross-sections 
fiGURE K.3. DIAGRAM OF THE MODERN TRIREME 0LYMPIAS. 
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of a trireme, have demonstrated the difficulties that a crew would have in hearing and 
executing orders in quiet, controlled conditions, much less in the tumult of battle. 
§5. It is no wonder, then, that commanders frequently resorted to trickery and 
unorthodox measures to increase their chance of success. The outcomes of many of 
the sea battles recounted by Xenophon hinged on the element of surprise. One 
favored technique was the attack or escape under cover of night.• Landmarks were 
the primary means of navigation in Greek antiquity, and so sailing was mainly a day­
light activity. Even battles ceased at sundown. Perhaps because it was so unusual, 
Xenophon vividly describes the extraordinary nature of the Spartan vice-admiral 
Gorgopas' nighttime pursuit of an Athenian squadron and the ensuing moonlight 
batde.b Experience on the Olympias indicates that rowing triremes is always a noisy 
process and sound carries great distances over water. Night escapades could only 
have been successful because they exploited what the enemy reasonably expected. 
Other tricks succeeded for the same reason. Whatever the exact purpose of Konon's 
sidescreens,' his escape plan worked because repetition lulled the enemy into com­
placent inattention. Those tables were famously turned on Konon at Aigospotamoi,d 
where the Athenians were defeated not by fast ships or skilled crews but by hungry 
bellies and each side's expectation that the other would follow precedent. 
§6. A rammed ship, even if severely damaged, did not sink immediately. There 
were no significant obstacles to bar the crews from jumping overboard; the empty 
wooden hull would swamp and become completely unmaneuverable but would float 
on the surface for some time until it became completely waterlogged and finally sank. 
It was the victor's prerogative to sail out among the debris of the battlefield and col­
lect the drifting hulls and men. Captured enemy were enslaved (or worse);• captured 
hulls were refitted or salvaged for parts and material. b Rams, which were made of 
bronze and could weigh more than half a ton, were salvaged where possible for the 
value of the metal or perhaps for reuse on other ships. Sometimes captured rams were 
sawn off by the victors and erected as trophies on land nearest to the battle site.' 
§7. The Achilles' heel of the ancient navy was its crew. The need to feed, finance, 
occupy, and sometimes even inspire the rowers was a crucial element of any naval 
campaign. First and foremost was the need to feed and rest the rowers. Rowing was 
a cramped, stifling, sweaty, smelly job. The long, narrow warships had limited space 
for provisions or preparing meals and no place at all for rowers to stretch out and 
sleep. One of the extraordinary aspects of the Spartan admiral Teleutias' night raid 
into the Peiraieus harbor was that the ships were rowed continuously, with oarsman 
resting (presumably at their benches) at alternating turns.• Every trireme captain had 
to think daily about where he would be able to stop for the night and how his sailors 
would get fed. Sailors could bring some food on board and eat "on the run," but 
more often mealtimes meant putting in to shore to allow sailors to forage in town or 
countryside. These midday breaks, when ships were beached and troops dispersed, 
K.5a For instances in the Hellmika where forces 
maneu·vered at night in order tO surprise their 
opponent, see 1.1.13, 1.6.28, 4.8.35, 5.1.8-9, 
5.1.19, 5.1.25, 6.2.11. 
K.5b See 5 1.8-9. 
K.5c See 1.6.19 and n. 1.6.19a. 
K.5d See 2.1.20-29. Lysander's trickery exploited the 
poor decision made by the Athenian leaders to 
locate their base camp far away from city markets 
that could supply food to the fleet's crews. 
K.6a See2.1.31. 
K.6b See 1.1.18, where Syracusans burn ships rather 
than lea\'C them to their \'ictorious opponents. 
K.6c See 2.3.8, 6.2.36. 
K.7a Sec 5.1.19. 
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were moments of great vulnerability. Lysander based his winning strategy at 
Aigospotamoi on his enemies' need to forage for meals far from their ships.b The 
Athenian Iphikrates, whom Xenophon praises as the naval commander par excel­
lence,< forestalled this danger by training his men simultaneously to eat and to main­
tain lookouts and be at the ready for immediate redeployment.d Logistics forced 
fleets to hug the coasts-a factor that had to be planned for defensively and could be 
aggressively exploited. 
§8. A trireme captain also had to keep his crew paid. The crew could consist of all 
or a mixture of slaves, lower-class citizens, resident aliens (metics ), or mercenaries.• All 
had to be paid to row, as they needed to purchase food and other necessities with their 
own funds.b Oarsmen, especially noncitizens, might change ships for better pay. 
Lysander, for example, urged Artaxerxes to fix the pay at one Attic drachma per day on 
the grounds that "if this was the wage offered, the Athenian crews would desert their 
ships. "c Lysander, Kallikratidas, Konon, and Teleutias all struggled to fund their fleets,d 
and Xenophon's account is peppered with references to the need to pay rowers.• 
§9. Idle crews were a potential source of trouble and were certainly a waste of 
money. Thus we hear of Syracusan sailors helping the city of Antandros finish fortifica­
tions while their fleet was being rebuilt, of Konon's sailors rebuilding the Long Walls, 
and of Iphikrates "maintaining" his sailors by letting them work on the land for the 
Corcyraeans.• The task of keeping sailors employed was particularly troublesome when 
the fleets remained stationed abroad over the winter. The sailing and fighting season 
regularly lasted from May through September; cold temperatures, storms, and con­
trary winds and currents reduced sea traffic to a minimum in the intervening months, 
although some instances of voyages and even battles during winter are known. b 
§10. Maintaining crew cohesiveness was paramount to the effective functioning 
of the trireme. Trials on the Olympias demonstrated that even very experienced row­
ers need extensive group practice in order to coordinate their strokes sufficiently to 
achieve the speeds and perform the maneuvers ascribed to triremes. First, each indi­
vidual had to became proficient at rowing on a specific level: oar mechanics and visi­
bility varied significantly depending on one's position relative to the waterline and 
the ends of the ship. Second, close cooperation was vital to keeping all those oars 
working in tandem; the consequences of blades clashing like a row of falling domi­
noes could easily wreak havoc along the entire line. The need for constant training 
was no different in antiquity.• One unexpected discovery of the modern experiment 
was that the dense wooden environment absorbed sound within the confines of the 
K.7b See 2.1.25, 2.1.27. 
K.7c See 6.2.32. 
K.7d See 6.2.28-29. 
K.8a For use of mercenaries at sea, see 7.1.12; for slaves, 
see 1.6.24 and S.l.ll; for me tics, see Thucydides 
7.63.3. 
K.8b See 2.1.27. 
K.8c See 1.5.4. 
K.8d See 1.1.24-25, 1.5.3-8, 1.6.6, 1.6.18, 2. l.ll, 
2.l.l4, 4.8.10, 4.8.12, 5.1.24. See also 2.3.40, 
6.2.1. 
K.8e See 1.5.4-7, 1.6.12, 2.1.5, 2.l.l2, 5.l.l3, 5.1.24. 
K.9a For Syracusans at Antandros (Ref. Map 2, AY), see 
1.1.26; for rebuilding the Long Walls of Athens 
(Ref. Map 5), see 4.8.10; for lphikrates' sailors 
worl<.ing the land at Corcyra (Ref. Map 2, BW), see 
6.2.37. 
K.9b All locations in this note can be found on Ref. 
Map 2 at the coordinates indicated. See Thucy· 
dides 8. 30-44 for naval operations in the winter 
of 412/11 in the Aegean (BX), Samos (CY}, Chios 
(CY), Rhodos (DY}, Ionia (CY}, and Caria (CZ). 
At l.l.l2 the battle of Abydos (AY) is thought by 
some to have been fought as late as November, 
and others believe that the battle of Cyzicus (AY), 
l.l.l4-19, took place earlier than May 410. 
K.lOa Mindaros' fleet was out practicing maneuvers at 
1.1.16. Iphikrates had his fleet train and practice 
maneuvers as it sailed toward Corcyra, 6.2.30, 
6.2.32. 
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hull, making it very difficult for the rowers to hear signals. As a result, each oarsman 
relied heavily on the body language of those sitting directly in front of or above 
him. The crew became an integrated network, and holes or substitutions in the row­
ing arrangement threw a wrench in the gears of the rowing machine. Rowers were 
not randomly replaceable. 
§11. It was the responsibility of the captain (trierarch) to keep his crew trained 
and intact.• In the Athenian system, captaincy was a one-year public service, under­
taken by only the wealthiest citizens as a sort of patriotic burden or tax. The state 
supplied a ship, the minimum necessary equipment, and the basic rate of pay for a 
crew; the captain was responsible for hiring the crew and outfitting and maintaining 
(and returning) the ship. The amateur captain probably relied heavily on his paid 
staff. The most important member (and the only one who is ever named) was the 
helmsman (kybernetes). Alcibiades trusted his helmsman, Antiochos, enough to give 
him command of the fleet during Alcibiades' absence, and it is the helmsmen who 
are caJJed as witnesses in the trial of the Arginousai generals.b Ultimate command of 
a fleet lay in the hands of one or several of the generals (strategoi) elected by the cit­
izens to lead the army or the fleet. Sparta had a specific office of admiral (navarch), 
but men appointed to this position might or might not have much experience on 
the water ,c and the assignment of a commander perceived as incompetent was 
another potential source of grumbling among the crews.d 
§12. Xenophon's predecessor, Thucydides, had chronicled the glory days of clas­
sical sea power. Control of the water serves as a focus and a metaphor in his story of 
Athenian imperialism. He gives us, also, a glimpse of the beginning of the end. We 
see the Athenians lose their edge in naval technology; the Peloponnesian allies 
develop new warship designs and strategies that the Athenians emulate too late. 
Xenophon is by comparison a landlubber; the sea is an element, but not a center­
piece, in his account of Athens' and Sparta's final bitter decline. His story of the sea 
and its ships is not nearly as detailed or coherent. But in his narrative we can see the 
human dimension of naval warfare and the pivotal role of the anonymous rowers in 
the struggle for command of the Aegean. Two generations later, Alexander the 
Great circumvented the need for rowers and gained control of the seas by conquer­
ing the coasts and ports on which the fleets of the eastern Mediterranean relied for 
manpower, provisions, and timber. 
K.ll a For difficulties in keeping triremes fully manned, 
see 1.5.20, 5.1.27, 6.2.12. 
K.ll b Akibiades leaves Antiochos in charge at 
1.5.11-12, and the generals furnish a helmsman as 
a witness in the Arginousai trial at 1.7.6. Another 
instance in the Hellmilt4 that shows the impor· 
ranee of the helmsman is at 1.6.32, when Her· 
Nicolle Hirschfeld 
Assistant Professor 
Department of Classical Studies 
Trinity University 
San Antonio, Texas 
mon the Megarian advises the Spartan admiral 
Kallikratidas. 
K.llc Agesilaos a p pointed his inexperienced brother· in· 
law Pcisander to command the Spartan fleet 
(3.4.29). 
K.lld Spartan sailors complained of Kallikratidcs' quali· 
fications when he replaced Lysander (1.6.4). 
